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Abstract 
India’s financial sector is not deeply integrated with the global financial system, which spared 
it the first round adverse effects of the global financial crisis and left Indian banks mostly 
unaffected. However, as the financial crisis morphed in to a full-blown global economic 
downturn, India could not escape the second round effects. The global crisis has affected 
India through three distinct channels: financial markets, trade flows, and exchange rates. 
The reversal in capital inflows, which created a credit crunch in domestic markets along with 
a severe deterioration in export demand, contributed to the decline of gross domestic 
product by more than 2 percentage points in the fiscal year 2008–2009. In line with efforts 
taken by governments and central banks all over the world, the Government and the 
Reserve Bank of India took aggressive countercyclical measures, sharply relaxing monetary 
policy and introducing a fiscal stimulus to boost domestic demand. However, this paper 
argues that with very limited fiscal maneuverability and the limited traction of monetary 
policy, policy measures to restore the Indian gross domestic product growth back to its 
potential rate of 8–9% must focus on addressing the structural constraints that are holding 
down private investment demand. 
 
JEL Classification: G01, E66 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The Indian economy looked to be relatively insulated from the global financial crisis that 
started in August 2007 when the sub-prime mortgage crisis first surfaced in the United 
States (US). In fact, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) was raising interest rates until August 
2008 with the explicit objective of cooling the economy and bringing down the gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth rate, which visibly had moved above the rate of potential 
output growth and was contributing to the build up of inflationary pressures in the economy.
1 
But when the collapse of Lehman Brothers on 23 September 2008 morphed the US financial 
meltdown into a global economic downturn, the impact on the Indian economy was almost 
immediate. External credit flows suddenly dried up and the overnight money market interest 
rate spiked to above 20% and remained high for the next month. It is perhaps judicious to 
assume that the impacts of the global economic downturn on the Indian economy are still 
unfolding. Against this backdrop, this paper attempts an analysis of the impact of the global 
financial crisis on the Indian economy and suggests some policy measures to put the 
economy back on track. 
Broadly, the paper has been divided into six sections. After summarizing the severity of the 
current crisis in Section 2, Section 3 deals with the impact of the crisis on the Indian 
economy. Section 4 discusses the monetary and fiscal policy responses to the crisis, while 
Section 5 provides a critical assessment of the policy responses. In the final section we 
recommend some policy measures that are needed to reverse the downturn. 
2.  SEVERITY OF THE CURRENT FINANCIAL CRISIS  
Banking and financial crises have been a regular feature of modern economic history. 
According to one estimate, there have been 86 banking crises since the Great Depression 
that have spread beyond national borders. According to a World Bank study in 2001,
2 the 
world has witnessed as many as 112 systemic banking crises from the late 1970s to early 
2001. Most crises, including the current one, share some common features. Some general 
examples include a search for increasingly higher yields in financial markets, a lax regulatory 
regime, a mismatch in appetite for risk and the capacity for bearing it, and the consequent 
build up of asset bubbles, usually in the real estate sector, which for various reasons is 
overlooked by the regulators. The recent financial sector crisis shares most, if not all, of 
these features. However, what makes the current crisis exceptional is that it emerged at the 
very epicentre of global capitalism, the US, and its contagion spread very quickly to the 
entire global economy, unlike previous crises that were usually confined to a region or a 
small number of countries. Economies like India and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
where the financial sectors were not as integrated with the global financial system, were 
spared the first round adverse effects of the current crisis and their banks were left mostly 
unaffected. However, these giant economies and their Asian neighbors could not escape the 
second round effects that severely impacted their trade flows due to the collapse of output 
and trade in advanced economies. 
The severity of the current crisis can be gauged by the steep decline in the equity markets of 
advanced economies. The bursting of the sub-prime housing bubble caused Wall Street to 
lose a staggering US$8 trillion in market capitalization in a very short time (Brunnermier 
2009). Interestingly, the loss in market capitalization and crash in equity prices has been 
                                                  
1 Several observers, led by Surjit Bhalla, had been pointing out since May 2008 that inflation, which had gone as 
high as 12.3% at the end of June 2008, was largely imported and a result of global commodity price hikes. 
Therefore, inflation had little to do with India’s own rate of economic growth, which started to slow down in the 
third quarter of FY2007–2008 after reaching the highest level of 10.6% in the second quarter of the same fiscal 
year. See Bhalla (2008). 
2 For detail, see Wolf (2008) 
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significantly higher in periphery economies as compared to US markets (Table 1). According 
to Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2009) global stock markets fell faster during the current crisis 
than in 1929. 
Table 1: Stock Market Crash and Exchange Rate Changes of Selected Countries 
   Stock Market Changes  
June–December 2008 (%) 
Exchange Rate Changes 
June–December 2008  
vis-à-vis US$ (%) 
PRC   -48  1 
Hong Kong, China  -40  1 
India -41  -13 
Republic of Korea  -36  -20 
Argentina -51  -13 
Brazil -49  -31 
Mexico -29  -26 
Japan -36  18 
Eurozone -37  -11 
US (S&P 500)  -36  - 
Source: Loser (2009). 
The financial crisis soon morphed in to a full-fledged global economic downturn as credits 
markets froze, aggregate demand in all advanced economies fell, and commodity prices 
crashed, forcing exporters to shelve expenditure and lay off workers in large numbers. 
Consequently, industrial production collapsed worldwide. In the last quarter of the calendar 
year 2008, advanced economies and large economies like India and the PRC witnessed a 
contraction in their industrial production. In some of the major export-oriented countries like 
Japan, Germany, and Brazil, industrial output contracted more than 10% during the third and 
fourth quarters of fiscal year (FY) 2008. The decline in industrial output made labor 
retrenchment and surging unemployment almost inevitable. According to the International 
Labour Organisation’s (2009) Global Employment Trends Report more than 50 million 
people are expected to lose their jobs due to the crisis. 
The severity and suddenness of the crisis can also be judged from the IMF’s forecast for the 
global economy. During the last 10 months (July 2008 to April 2009), the IMF revised its 
forecasts four times, all in the negative direction. In July 2008, it projected a growth rate of 
3.9% for the world economy for 2009. However, this figure was reduced to 2.2% in 
November 2008 and further to 0.5% in January 2009. Finally in April 2009, for the first time 
in 60 years, the IMF predicted a global recession with negative growth of 1.3% for world 
GDP in 2009. Comparisons with the Japanese experience since the bursting of its own real 
estate bubble in the late 1980s and the consequent stagnation over the 1990s have been 
drawn to suggest a possible long period of weak economic activity in advanced economies. 
Initially the IMF projected a positive growth rate of 1.8% for 2010 indicating a somewhat 
weak V-shape recovery. But by July 2009 this had changed and the possible recovery in 
2010 was forecast to be much stronger. Because the recession in developed countries is 
expected to continue, developing countries are anticipated to lead the global turnaround. 
2 
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Table 2: IMF Growth Projections 
   GDP Estimates for 2009  GDP Estimates 2010 
Jul 2008  Nov 2008  Jan 2009  Apr 2009  Jan 2009  Apr 2009 
US 0.8  -0.7  -1.6  -2.7  1.1  -0.04 
United 
Kingdom 
1.7 -1.3 -2.8 -4.0  0.2  -0.4 
Germany 1.0  -0.8  -2.5  -5.0  0.1 -1.0 
Japan 1.5  -0.2  -2.6  -6.1  0.6  0.5 
France 1.4 -0.5  -1.9 -2.9  0.7  0.4 
Canada 1.9  0.3  -1.2  -2.5 1.6  1.1 
Italy 0.5  -0.6  -2.1 -4.4  -0.1  -0.4 
Russia 7.3 3.5 -0.7  -5.9  1.3  0.5 
PRC  9.8 8.5 6.7 6.5  8.0  7.5 
India  8.0 6.3 5.1 4.5  6.5  5.6 
World  3.9  2.2  0.5  -1.3  3.0  1.8 
Source: IMF (2008b, 2009). 
The fear is that the rather grim economic outlook, as reflected in the IMF forecasts, may 
induce many countries to turn to protectionism to ensure sufficient demand for their domestic 
industry and prevent a further rise in unemployment. In a recent study, Gamberoni and 
Newfarmer (2009) found that since the onset of the current global crisis, 17 of the 23 
members of the informal G-20 grouping that met at the Washington Summit in November 
2008 have invoked protectionism in one form or another despite agreeing to not take any 
new protectionist measures. This is indeed worrisome because it will further exacerbate the 
decline in global trade, which already has seen a historical collapse since the crisis began in 
October 2008. Given the sharp export contraction in the world’s major exporting economies 
like Germany, Japan, and the PRC,
3 the growth rate of global trade fell from 6% in 2007 to 
2% in 2008 (Figure 1). Furthermore, according to the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
world trade is expected decline by as much as 9% in FY2009–2010, which would make it the 
biggest contraction in global trade since World War II. 
                                                  
3 The exports from these countries have registered a contraction of more than 35% in the last quarter of calendar 
year 2008. 
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Figure 1: Annual Growth of Global Trade Volumes 1981–2009, Actual and Forecast 
 
Source: World Trade Organization (2008, 2009). 
Essentially, the current crisis is truly global in nature and could be referred to as the worst 
crisis since the Great Depression. Fortunately, in sharp contrast to the experience during the 
Great Depression, the severity of the crisis was recognized early on and, even more 
important, governments in both advanced and emerging economies have coordinated their 
policy responses. Governments across the globe have announced various fiscal stimulus 
packages and huge amounts of liquidity have been injected into the system by central 
banks. Some countries like South Africa and the PRC have announced mega-stimulus 
packages that account for around 24.0% and 8% of their respective GDPs.
4 In absolute 
terms, the US has announced a bailout-cum-stimulus package of worth US$8.1 trillion. As 
shown in Table 3, if we add up the stimulus packages of nine selected countries,
5 the 
combined total comes to around US$10 trillion, which is roughly 20% of total world GDP. 
Given these initiatives, it is expected that the global economy will soon turn the corner and 
the recession will not be as prolonged as it was in 1929. 
                                                  
4 For details see Kumar et al. (2009). 
5 The countries were selected based on the availability of information and the size of their economy. 
4 




Table 3: Major Fiscal Stimulus in Selected Countries/Economic Regions 
Ser. No  Country Name  Amount, US$ bn 
1 Japan  516.3 
2 EU  254.6 
3 Australia  7.4 
4 PRC  586 
5  Republic of Korea  11.3 
6 Chile  2 
7 Mexico  5.8 
8 India  80 
9 US  8,410 
10 Total  9,873.4 
Source: Economic Advisory Council (2009), and author’s compilation from media sources. 
3.  IMPACT OF CRISIS ON THE INDIAN ECONOMY 
3.1  Global Integration of Indian Economy 
In response to its balance of payments (BOP) crisis in the early 1990s, India implemented a 
series of trade, industry, and investment reforms. These reforms effectively liberalized the 
economy, ending a long period of relative isolation from global markets and financial and 
technology flows. Since then the Indian economy has become increasingly integrated with 
the world economy.
6  Consequently, current account flows (receipts and payments of 
merchandise and invisibles) as a proportion of GDP increased from 20% in FY1990–1991 to 
53% in FY2007–2008 (Figure 2). However, the most significant change can be witnessed in 
the capital account. Due to the rationalization of procedures and conditions for foreign 
investment, India has emerged as an attractive investment destination. This is reflected as 
an increase in foreign portfolio investment inflows from US$2 billion in FY2001–2002 to 
US$29 billion in FY2007–2008. Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows have also gone up 
significantly in recent years, having risen to US$34.3 billion in FY2007–2008 from US$6.1 
billion in FY2001–2002. At the same time, Indian corporations have also entered the global 
market for mergers and acquisitions, resulting in some capital account outflow from India. As 
a result, two-way flows of portfolio and direct foreign capital have gone up from a mere 12% 
of GDP in FY1990–1991, to 64% of the GDP in FY2007–2008, registering a fivefold 
increase. Interestingly, these ratios are significantly higher than those in the US, for which 
trade in goods and services constituted only 41% of GDP in 2007 and capital flows another 
25% in the same year. 
 
                                                  
6 The peak import duty on manufactured products was slashed from more than 200% in FY1990–1991 to about 
10% in FY2007–2008. Quantitative restrictions on imports have also been gradually phased out. ADBI Working Paper 164    Kumar and Vashisht 



































Source: Author’s calculations compiled from Reserve Bank of India (2009b).  
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3.2  Transmission of the Crisis to the Indian Economy 
With India’s increased linkage with the world economy, India could not be expected to 
remain immune to the global crisis or be decoupled from the global economy. While it is 
true that the Indian banking sector remained largely unaffected because of its very 
limited operations outside India or exposure to sub-prime lending by foreign investment 
banks, the global crisis has affected India through three distinct channels. These 
channels are financial markets, trade flows, and exchange rates. 
The financial sector includes the banking sector, equity markets (which are directly 
affected by foreign institutional investment [FII] flows), external commercial borrowings 
(ECBs) that drive corporate investments, FDI, and remittances. The global crisis had a 
differentiated impact on these various sub-sectors of the financial sector.  
Given prudent regulations and a proactive regulator,
7 the Indian banking sector has 
remained more or less unaffected, at least directly, by the global crisis. The imposition 
by the RBI of a higher provisioning requirement on commercial bank lending to the real 
estate sector helped to curb the growth of a real estate price bubble. This is one of the 
few global examples of a countercyclical capital provisioning requirement by any central 
bank. In general, Indian banks were not overly exposed to sub-prime lending. Only one 
of the larger private sector banks, ICICI Bank, was partly exposed but it managed to 
thwart a crisis because of its strong balance sheet and timely action by the government, 
which virtually guaranteed its deposits. The banking sector as a whole has maintained a 
healthy balance sheet. In fact, during the third quarter of FY2008, which was a 
nightmare for many big financial institutions around the world, banks in India announced 
encouraging results. Against an absolute decline in the profitability of non-financial 
corporate enterprises, the banking sector witnessed a jump of 43% in its profitability 
(Figure 3). A ban on complex structures like synthetic securitization coupled with a close 
monitoring of appropriate lending norms by RBI also ensured a better quality of banking 
assets. The non-performing assets as a ratio to gross advances have remained well 
within prudential norms (Figure 4). Further, with an average capital risk weighted assets 
ratio (CRAR) of 13%, Indian banks are well capitalized and better placed to weather the 
economic downturn. 
                                                  
7 The RBI, under the leadership of Dr. Y. V. Ready, has acted very proactively many times. In 2006, when 
land purchases were skyrocketing, he imposed a ban on the use of bank loans for land purchase. 
7 
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Figure 3: Quarterly Profit Margin and Profit Growth of the Indian Banking Sector. 
 
 
Source: Center for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) Prowess database. 
Available: http://www.cmie.com/database/?service=database-products/firm-level-data-services/prowess-
corporate-database.htm (accessed on 20 May 2009).  
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Source: Reserve Bank of India (2008). Available: http://www.cmie.com/database/?service=database-
products/firm-level-data-services/prowess-corporate-database.htm (accessed on 20 May 2009). 
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However, the indirect impacts of the crisis have affected Indian banks quite badly. The 
liquidity squeeze in global markets following the collapse of Lehman Brothers compelled 
Indian banks and corporations to shift their credit demand from external sources to the 
domestic banking sector. This move exerted a lot of pressure on liquidity in the domestic 
market and consequently short-term lending rates shot up abnormally. The inter-bank 
call money rate spiked to 20% in October 2008 and remained high for the next month 
(Figure 5). This credit crunch, coupled with the loss of confidence that followed the 
Lehman Brothers episode, increased the risk aversion of Indian banks and eventually 
hurt credit expansion in the domestic market. Contrary to the trend, non-food credit 
expansion started declining in November 2008 and became negative in January 2009 
(Figure 6). The magnitude of the impact of the crisis can be understood from the fact that 
non-food credit expansion during last five months of FY2008–2009 has declined by more 
than 68% as compared with the same period in previous financial year.  

























































































































































































































Source: Reserve Bank of India (2009a). 
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Source: Reserve Bank of India-Weekly Statistical Supplements-Extracts. 
Available: http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_ViewWSSExtract.aspx (accessed 30 June 2009).  
                                                
After an impressive performance for nearly five years, foreign capital inflows lost their 
momentum in the second half of 2008. The most significant change was observed in the 
case of FIIs, which saw a strong reversal of flows. Against a net inflow of US$20.3 billion 
in FY2007–2008, there was a net outflow of US$15 billion from Indian markets during 
FY2008–2009 as foreign portfolio investors sought safety and mobilized resources to 
strengthen the balance sheet of their parent companies. This massive outflow of FII 
created panic in the stock markets. Consequently, equity markets lost more than 60% of 
their index value and about US$1.3 trillion of market capitalization from an index peak of 
about 21,000 in January 2008 to 8,867 by 20 March 2009. This bad run at Dalal Street
8 
wiped out the primary market completely, which had been flourishing before the onset of 
the crisis. Between FY2007–2008 and FY2008–2009, fund collection through the 
primary market declined by 63%. In 2007, 106 initial public offerings (IPO) were issued 
and raised a total amount of about US$11 billion. In contrast, only 38 IPOs were issued 
in 2008 and resulted in accumulations of only US$3.8 billion. 
Given the presence of unutilized liquidity in the global market, and India being one of the 
few countries with positive growth, FIIs have once again started flowing back to India 
(Figure 7). During the first two months of the current financial year (April and May 2009), 
Indian equity markets received net FII inflows of more than US$5 billion. Consequently, 
equity markets have partially gained their lost value. However, owing to prevailing 
uncertainties, the primary market has still not shown any sign of recovery. Most of the 
companies have put their IPOs on hold and only one IPO has been issued so far in 
2009. 
 
8 The Bombay stock market is often referred as Dalal Street. 
10 
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Figure 7: Monthly Net Foreign Institutional Investment (FII) Inflows 
   
Source: SEBI Bulletin http://www.sebi.gov.in/Index.jsp?contentDisp=Database (accessed 30 June 2009). 
 
 











































































































































































Source: Historical values for Bombay Stock Exchange indices. 
Available: http://www.bseindia.com/histdata/hindices.asp (accessed 30 Ma
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Source: Author’s calculations compiled from Bombay Stock Exchange Key Statistics. 
Available http://www.bseindia.com/about/st_key/volumeofturnoverbusiness_tran.asp (accessed 30 June 20
and Central Statistical Organization (200
09) 
9). 
                                                
The economic boom in India from FY2004–2005 to FY2007–2008 has also been 
accompanied by a substantial increase in the inflows of FDI and external commercial 
borrowings. The inflows of FDI increased from US$6 billion in FY2004–2005 to US$34.3 
billion in FY2007–2008 (Figure 10). The surge in FDI not only improved the domestic 
rate of capital formation but also helped many industries improve in a technological 
capacity due to the technology inflows that accompanied these FDI inflows. Like FDI, the 
inflows of ECBs also went up from US$9 billion in FY2004–2005 to US$30.3 billion in 
FY2007–2008, registering a threefold increase over four years. The spurt in ECBs 
benefited Indian entrepreneurs in two different ways. First, it supported them in their 
overseas mergers and acquisitions, making it easier for them to gain a market presence 
in target countries. Secondly, the influx of ECBs allowed Indian firms to finance their 
domestic capacity expansion at relatively lower capital costs. 
Both FDI inflows and ECB volumes have been adversely affected by the turmoil in the 
financial markets in advanced economies. Given the credit crunch in the global markets 
since September 2008, Indian corporates managed to raise only US$18 billion in 
FY2008–2009 as commercial credit from the overseas market, which is 41% less than 
the amount raised in the previous year. The fall was rather phenomenal during the 
second half of FY2008–2009 (Figure 11), when ECB approvals
9 declined from US$3 
billion in September 2008 to less than US$0.5 billion in February 2009. Likewise, though 
not to the same extent, FDI inflows have also taken a hit. For the first time in last six 
years, FDI inflows witnessed a negative growth of 2% in FY2008–2009. 
 
9 Monthly inflows of actual ECB are not available. 
12 
 ADBI Working Paper 164    Kumar and Vashisht 


































Source: Reserve Bank of India (2009a). 
 
 
Figure 11: Monthly External Commercial Borrowing, Approvals 
 
Source: External Commercial Borrowings, Reserve Bank of India. 
Available: http://rbi.org.in/scripts/ECBView.aspx (accessed 20 June 2009).  
Remittances are another source of inward foreign capital flows that in the past have 
helped to balance India’s large trade account deficit and keep the current account deficit 
at a reasonable level. The remittances from overseas Indians started feeling the impact 
of the global crisis during the third quarter of FY2008–2009 when, on a year-on-year 
basis, they declined by 0.5%. The impact becomes more evident in the fourth quarter of 
FY2008–2009 when the inflow of remittances declined by more then 29% as compared 
to the same period in previous year (Figure 12). With the poor economic outlook for oil 
producing economies in the Gulf and West Asia, coupled with rising pressure against 
immigration in advanced countries, it is expected that remittances will further decline in 
the coming quarters. 
13 
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Source: Reserve Bank of India (2009c). 
The sluggishness of the inflows of FDI, ECBs, and remittances combined with the 
massive outflow of FII has resulted in the significant deterioration of India’s capital 
account in FY2008–2009. From its peak in September 2007, the capital account surplus 
as percent of GDP started to decline and disappeared completely by December 2008 
(Figure 13). This is the first time after a long period that the capital account component 
of India’s BOP has been negative. 






































FDI Portfolio Investment Loans 
Banking Capital  Total Capital Account 
 
Source: Author’s calculations compiled from Reserve Bank of India (2009c); Central Statistical Organization 
(2009). 
The second transmission of the global downturn to the Indian economy has been 
through the steep decline in demand for India’s exports in its major markets. Gems and 
jewelry was the first sector to feel pressure at the very beginning of the global meltdown. 
In November 2008, it witnessed a sharp decline in export orders from the US and 
14 
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Europe, which resulted in a retrenchment of more than 300,000 workers. Since then, the 
negative impact has expanded to other export-oriented sectors such as garments and 
textiles, leather, handicrafts, marine products, and auto components. Merchandise 
exports have registered a negative average growth of 17% from October 2008 to May 
2009. The decline in exports has been accelerating, falling by 29.2% in May 2009 as 
compared to the same month in 2008 (Figure 14). In all likelihood, it seems difficult for 
merchandise exports to recover within this calendar year. 
Like merchandise, exports of services are also facing a rather steep downturn. During 
the third quarter of FY2008–2009, growth in service exports declined to a mere 5.9% as 
compared to 34.0% in the corresponding period a year back. The earnings from travel, 
transportation, insurances, and banking services have contracted, while the growth rate 
of software exports has declined by more than 21 percentage points (Table 4). The real 
shock came in the fourth quarter of FY2008–2009 when service exports witnessed a 
contraction of 6.6% as compared to the same period in the previous year. 


































































































































Source: Ministry of Commerce, Government of India (2008–2009). 
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Table 4: Quarterly Year-on-Year Growth Rate of Services Exports 
  Q3 2007–08  Q3 2008–09  Q4 2008–09 
Services 34.0  5.9  -6.6 
 Travel  11.6  -13.9  -25.9 
 Transportation  21.0  -8.1  -7.9 
 Insurance  19.4  -21.5  -28.5 
 G.n.i.e.  11.5  7.8  3.8 
 Miscellaneous, of which  40.9  1.5  -2.1 
Software Services  41.3  19.5  -12.7 
Business Services  17.4  -12.6  -15.1 
Financial Services  34.2  0.8  -13.5 
G.n.i.e. = Government not included elsewhere. 
Source: Reserve Bank of India (2009c). 
Though exports of both goods and services still account for only about 22% of the Indian 
GDP, their multiplier effect for economic activity is quite large as the import content is not 
high, unlike Chinese exports. This is reflected in the manufacturing sector output 
experiencing a sharp slowdown in recent months, during which exports have also shown 
a decline. The index of manufacturing sector output (Manufacturing IIP), which had 
grown at 9.6% during FY2007–2008 and by 5.3% in the first half of FY2008–2009, 
slowed down to 0.5% in the third quarter and further to -0.16% in the fourth quarter of 
FY2008–2009. Therefore, the export slump is expected to have a significant impact on 
GDP growth in the coming period. 
The third transmission channel is the exchange rate. With the outflow of portfolio 
investments and higher foreign exchange demand by Indian entrepreneurs who are 
seeking to replace external commercial borrowing by domestic financing, the Indian 
rupee has come under pressure. During last 12 months (from April 2008 to March 2009) 
the Indian rupee has tumbled by 27% vis-à-vis the US dollar. At the same time, foreign 
exchange reserves have also fallen by US$60 billion
10 (Figure 15). However, with 
foreign exchange reserves remaining at 110% of total external debt at the end of 
December 2008, investment sentiments should not be unduly affected in the near term. 
The nearly 25% depreciation in the Indian rupee’s exchange rate has partially nullified 
the benefits from the decline in global oil and gas prices and has increased the cost of 
commercial borrowings. The weaker Indian rupee should, however, encourage exporters 
and it is possible that with imports declining as sharply as exports that the country’s 
trade deficit may actually improve in the short run. Additionally, the external sector 
balance may remain stable and not pose any major policy issue.  
                                                  
10 Here it should be noted that around 63% of decline in foreign exchange reserve can be attributed to 
valuation, hence the actual decline in reserves is just around US$20 billion. 
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Source: Reserve Bank of India-Weekly Statistical Supplements- Extracts. 
Available: http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_ViewWSSExtract.aspx (accessed 30 June 2009) 
                                                
The timing of the external shock arising from the global economic downturn has been 
rather unfortunate. The Indian economy was already in the middle of a policy-induced 
slowdown and the crisis has further aggravated it. The impact of the global crisis on the 
real economy became evident in the third quarter of FY2008–2009, belying the optimistic 
official pronouncements and expectations of some economists,
11  when the Indian 
economy registered a modest growth rate of 5.3%,
12 significantly lower than 8.9% 
achieved in the corresponding period in FY2007–2008, and after having achieved a 
7.8% growth in GDP in the first half of FY2008–2009. At the sectoral level, robust growth 
in community, social, and personal services (22.5%) and financial, real estate, and 
business services (8.3%) enabled the services sector to maintain healthy growth despite 
the sharp decline in trade, hotel, transportation, and communication services. The 
secondary sector in general and the manufacturing sector in particular performed 
extremely badly. In the wake of a decline in domestic and export demand, the 
manufacturing sector witnessed a moderate growth of 0.9%, while growth in construction 
slowed down significantly from 9.7% to 4.2%. 
However, estimates for economic growth in the final quarter of FY2008–2009 (from 
January to March 2009) have pegged the growth at 5.8% and the full year’s GDP growth 
at 6.7%. These is sharply lower than the average GDP growth of 8.9% during the 
previous four years (from FY2004–2005 to FY2007–2008) and also lower than 7.1%, 
which was the official estimate announced at the time of the interim budget in February 
2009. The key question is whether the 5.8% growth in the fourth quarter of FY2008–
 
11 Until September 2008, a few economists, along with some forecasting agencies, were projecting a very 
healthy growth rate for the financial year 2008–09. During a seminar organized by ICRIER on 19 
September 2008, Dr. Surjit Bhalla predicted that India would grow by 9.0% while in the same seminar 
Mahesh Vayas of CMIE projected a growth rate of 9.4%. 
12 Recently the growth rate for third quarter has been revised from 5.3% to 5.8% 
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2009 already reflects a turnaround in the economy, which may be expected to achieve a 
higher GDP growth in FY2009–2010 (Table 5). 
In our view, this is far too optimistic. The economy will in all likelihood continue on its 
downward trend in the first half of FY2009–2010 (from April to September 2009) before it 
recovers in the second half as the impacts of the global crisis on the Indian economy 
potentially taper off by October 2009. For FY2009–2010 we expect the GDP growth to 
be about 6.0%, still lower than 6.7% in FY2008–2009. This estimate is based on a model 
of “leading economic indicators”
13 that is used to forecast the GDP growth and whose 
estimates are given in Figure 16. 
 
13 This has been developed by the macro group in ICRIER. Using the LEI methodology we predicted a 
growth of GDP at 9.2% for FY2007–2008 in November 2007. Most other agencies had predicted a lower 
growth rate of 8.5% or below for the same year against the actual growth rate of 9%. Again in FY2008–
2009, ICRIER was the first among all Indian forecasting agencies to point out the economic slowdown. 
Based on our model, we projected a growth rate of 6.3% for FY2008–2009 against the actual figure of 
6.7%. For details see Kumar et al. (2009). ADBI Working Paper 164    Kumar and Vashisht 
Table 5: Quarterly Estimates of GDP Growth for FY2007–2008 and FY2008–2009 
Industry  
FY2007–2008  FY2008–2009 
Q1  Q2 Q3 Q4  Annual  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4  Annual 
1. Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing  4.3  3.9 8.1 2.2 4.9 3.0 2.7 -0.8 2.7 1.6 
2. Mining and Quarrying  0.1  3.8 4.2 4.7 3.3 4.6 3.7 4.9 1.6 3.6 
3. Manufacturing  10  8.2 8.6 6.3 8.2 5.5 5.1 0.9 -1.4 2.4 
4. Electricity, Gas, and Water Supply  6.9  5.9 3.8 4.6 5.3 2.7 3.8 3.5 3.6 3.4 
5. Construction  11.0 13.4 9.7  6.9 10.1 8.4 9.6 4.2 6.8 7.2 
6. Trade, Hotel, Transport, and 
Communication  13.1 10.9 11.7 13.8 12.4 13.0 12.1  5.9  6.3  9.0 
7. Finance, Real Estate, and Business 
Services  12.6 12.4 11.9 10.3 11.7  6.9 6.4 8.3 9.5 7.8 
8. Community, Social, and Personal 
Services  4.5  7.1 5.5 9.5 6.8 8.2  9 22.5  12.5  13.1 
9. GDP  9.2  9  9.3 8.6  9  7.8 7.7 5.8 5.8 6.7 
Source: Central Statistical Organization (2009). 
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4.  POLICY RESPONSES 
4.1  Fiscal Stimulus  
It should be pointed out that the initial fiscal stimulus was actually provided in the budget for 
FY2008–2009, announced in February 2008. Electoral considerations made this into an 
expansionary exercise that included massive increases in public outlays in support of 
employment guarantee schemes, farm loan waivers, pay commission rewards, and 
increases in food and fertilizer subsidies. This fiscal expansion is expressed by the revenue 
deficit increasing from 1.4% of the GDP in FY2007–2008 to 4.3% in FY2008–2009. At the 
same time the fiscal deficit of the central government increased from 2.7% in FY2007–2008 
to 6.1% in FY2008–2009. The expansionary public outlays included some measures that 
implied a hefty transfer of purchasing power to farmers and to the rural sector in general. 
These included farm loan waivers, funds allocated to the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Program (NREGP), Bharat Nirman (targeted for improving rural infrastructure) 
Prime Minister’s Rural Road Program, and a large increase in subsidies for fertilizers and 
electricity supplied to the farmers (Table 6). All of these measures were taken because of 
political considerations and not in response to the global crisis. Nevertheless, they have 
helped to shore up rural demand for both consumer durables and non-durables. In effect the 
higher than expected GDP growth rate in both the third and fourth quarters of FY2008–2009 
could be attributed to the budgetary splurge announced in February 2008. While this has 
succeeded in shoring up GDP growth by raising rural demand, it did not leave much fiscal 
space for the Government of India to respond in any significant manner to counter the 
impacts of the global downturn. 
However, some efforts were still mounted to counter the effects of the global economic slow 
down. Three fiscal stimulus packages—one each in the months of December, January, and 
March—were announced. These in aggregate amounted to Rs crore 106,050 or US$21 
billion,
14 which is approximately 2% of the GDP. This can be compared to the 4% of GDP 
that was provided as stimulus in the FY2008–2009 budget discussed in the paragraph 
above. The three post-December 2008 stimulus packages mainly are comprised by 
increased government spending on infrastructure, reduction in indirect taxes, and some 
assistance for export-oriented industries. In an attempt to boost the infrastructure spending 
that has been acknowledged as the most effective tool to counter economic downturn, the 
Government of India has increased its planned spending by US$4 billion and has also 
allowed the state governments to borrow an additional amount of US$6 billion from the 
market. Apart from this, the India Infrastructure Finance Company Limited (IIFCL), a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV) established in 2007, has been allowed to issue interest free bonds 
worth US$6 billion for refinancing the long-term loans for various infrastructure projects. 
                                                  
14 This is the direct fiscal burden of the three fiscal stimuli and does not include the indirect burden.  
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Table 6: Budget Outlay on Rural Sector 




1 Bharat  Nirman  6.25  8.18 
2 NREGA  6.00  6.02 
3  Fertilizer Subsidies (a+b+c) 
a. Indigenous  Urea 
b. Imported  Urea 










4 Farm  Loan  Waiver  13.06  - 
5  Total  40.49  24.20 
BE = budget estimates, NREGA = National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, RE = revised estimates. 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Government of India (2009). 
Secondly, to prop up domestic demand the central excise duty was gradually slashed from 
14% in December 2008 to 8% in March 2009 on all products except petroleum products. 
Likewise the services tax rate has also been brought down from 12% to 10%. The 
government has also provided some relief to export-oriented industries through subsidizing 
interest costs of exporters by up to 2%, subject to a minimum rate of 7% per annum. It has 
also allocated US$240 million for a full refund of terminal excise duty or central sales tax, 
wherever applicable, and another US$80 million for various export incentives schemes. The 
direct fiscal burden of all the aforementioned measures adds up to about 2% of total GDP. 
This looks rather small in comparison to the size of the stimulus in some other economies 
like the PRC and the US. However, if we include the stimulus provided in the FY2008–2009 
budget, the Indian government has in effect expanded its fiscal outlay by 6% of GDP during 
FY2008–2009. It can be argued that the economy may have fared better if more fiscal space 
was available to boost domestic demand to counter the collapse of external demand that 
started in November 2008.  
4.2  Monetary Policy Response  
With the objective of maintaining price stability alongside a reasonable rate of economic 
growth, the last two years have been very hectic for policymakers at the RBI. After a 
comfortable period of low inflation, the Indian economy started feeling the pressure of rising 
global commodity prices in the first quarter of FY2004–2005. In response to this rise in 
inflation, the RBI started tightening monetary policy in September 2004, raising the cash 
reserve ratios from 4.5% to 5.0%. As the inflationary situation worsened in the subsequent 
period, the tightening of monetary policy became even more aggressive. Consequently, 
inflation declined from around 8% in the middle of 2004 to less than 4% in September 2007. 
Nevertheless, coinciding with the rising global inflation trends, domestic inflation once again 
started increasing towards the end of 2007 and became a major headline in the first week of 
June 2008 when it entered the double-digit range for first time since the 1991 BOP crisis. It 
drew a sharp reaction from the RBI and the speed of monetary tightening was further 
increased. This credit tightening from FY2004–2005 onward ensured a soft landing of Indian 
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economy, which began overheating over the past three years with the actual growth rate 
exceeding its potential growth rate. As a result the growth rate began to slow down from the 
middle of FY2007–2008.  


















































































































































































































Reverse repo rate Repo rate Cash Reserve Ratio
 
Source: Reserve Bank of India (2009e). 
In the wake of global financial crisis and its potential adverse effects on the Indian economy, 
monetary policy shifted gear and became expansionary from October 2008. The rapid 
decline in Wholesale Price Index (WPI) inflation, which has come down from its peak level of 
around 13% in August 2008 to less than 1% in April 2009, allowed the RBI to completely 
shift its focus from inflation to growth. Since October 2008, the RBI has injected a 
considerable amount of liquidity into the economy through a series of policy rate cuts. The 
cash reserve ratios of banks has been brought down from 9% to 5%, while the repo rate
15 
has been slashed by 425 basis points. Further, in order to discourage the banks from 
parking overnight funds with the RBI, the reverse repo rate
16 has been gradually reduced 
from 6.0% in November 2008 to 3.25% in April 2009. The statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) has 
been lowered by one percentage point. Apart from this, some special refinancing schemes 
have also been announced to improve the liquidity for certain sectors (Table 7). The cash 
reserve ratios reduction of 400 basis points since September 2008 alone has led to an 
injection of US$32.7 billion. In addition, another sum of US$12.9 billion has been injected 
through unwinding the market stabilization scheme. As of April 2009, a cumulative amount of 
nearly US$80 billion has been pumped in to the system (RBI 2009d).
   
                                                  
15 The repo rate is a rate at which the RBI offers overnight liquidity to banks. 
16 The reverse repo rate is the rate that RBI pays on overnight funds deposited with it.  
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Table 7: Actual/Potential Release of Primary Liquidity Since Mid-September 2008  
1 CRR  Reduction  32.7 
2 MSS  Unwinding  12.9 
3 Term  Repo  Facility  12.2 
4  Increase in Export Credit Refinance  5.2 
5 Special  Refinance  Facility for SCBs (Non-RRB)  7.9 
6  Refinance Facility for SIDBI/NHB/EXIM Bank  3.3 
7  Liquidity Facility for NBFCs through SPV  5.1 
Total (1 to 7)  79.2 
Memo: SLR Reduction  8.2 
CRR = cash reserve ratios, EXIM = export import, MSS = market stabilization scheme, NBFCs = non-banking 
financial companies, NHB = national housing bank, RRB = regional rural banks, SCBs = scheduled commercial 
banks, SIDBI = small industries development bank of India  SLR = statutory liquidity ratio, SPV = special purpose 
vehicle. 
Note: Values are in US$ billion. 
Source: Compiled from Reserve Bank of India (2009d). 
As a result of the policy rate cuts, the prime lending rates of commercial banks have come 
down from 13.75–14.0% in October 2008 to 12.0–12.5% January 2009. The call money 
rates have also remained stable at low levels and the overnight money market rate has 
remained within the liquidity adjustment-facility corridor. 
Apart from the above-mentioned initiatives, the RBI has also liberalized the ECBs and FII 
related norms. To attract the foreign portfolio investors, the FII limit on corporate bonds has 
been increased from US$6 billion to US$15 billion. At the same time, in an attempt to boost 
the construction sector, developers have been permitted to raise ECBs for integrated 
townships projects, while NBFCs dealing exclusively with infrastructure financing have also 
been allowed to access ECBs from multilateral or bilateral financial institutions. 
It could be argued that the three fiscal stimulus packages, in conjunction with the transfer of 
purchasing power to the rural economy through increased budget outlays on the rural sector 
and the hike in minimum support prices of various crops, have saved aggregate demand and 
prevented GDP growth from plummeting in to negative territory. This has also been helped 
by the quick monetary policy response discussed above. In fact, in hindsight, our shock-
augmented leading indicator model that some experts at ICRIER have been using to 
forecast GDP growth for India
17 verifies this hypothesis. With the full impact of the external 
shock, we were expecting a growth rate of 5.3% in the fourth quarter of FY2008–2009. 
Nevertheless, with an actual growth rate of 5.8%, our calculation suggests that the fiscal 
stimulus has neutralized nearly 20% of the impact of the external shock. If we go with this 
line of argument, it seems that the growth will pickup marginally in the coming quarters 
because the monetary policy measures taken so far are expected to come in to play. Despite 
this, any hope for a major revival of economic growth in FY2009–2010 looks unrealistic as 
the positive impact of fiscal measures, such as the implementation of 6
th Pay Commission, is 
bound to taper off. According to our revised forecast, in a best-case scenario GDP would 
grow by 6.0% in FY2009–2010 while in the worst-case scenario it would only manage a 
growth rate of 5.0%. Other agencies like the IMF, World Bank, and ADB have also estimated 
Indian GDP growth in FY2009–2010 at similar levels in their latest forecasts released in 
March 2009. Thus, the Indian economy will come down from the 9.0% level that it had 
                                                  
17 For details see Kumar et al. (2009). 
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achieved in the last four years to 6.0–6.5%. The growth targets for the XI Plan
18 will also 
have to be lowered. 
Figure 17: Actual and Forecasted Quarterly GDP Growth 
 
 
Source: Central Statistical Organization (2009) and author’s own estimates.  
5.  ASSESSMENT OF THE POLICY RESPONSES 
The Indian fiscal policy response to the crisis can at best be summarized as having been 
preempted by political considerations that resulted in a fiscal expansion ahead of the global 
crisis and left only limited space to respond in the aftermath of the crisis. Hence the fiscal 
response after December 2008 could be argued to not have been as large as required.
19 
Given a high fiscal deficit (central and state combined) of 5.4% in FY2007–2008, India had 
limited fiscal maneuverability to begin with. However, due to electoral considerations a fiscal 
stimulus of nearly 4% of GDP was induced in the FY2008–2009 budget. This raised the 
combined fiscal deficit to about 10%, leaving barely any more for further fiscal stimulus after 
the crisis.  
The fiscal stimulus, though very small in size as compared to other countries, worsened the 
fiscal deficit further, increasing it to 11.4% in FY2008–2009. The increase in fiscal deficit had 
two implications. First, it drew a strong response from international credit rating agencies 
and the sovereign credit rating of India was in the danger of being lowered. Any further 
reduction in India’s credit rating could have serious implications for capital inflows. Secondly, 
the high fiscal deficit naturally led to an increase in government borrowings. Higher 
government borrowing also put a lot of pressure on the interest rate, as reflected in the 10-
year bond yield rate going up along with the announcement of the new stimulus packages. 
The long run interest rate increase could have serious implications for private investment. 
The debt to GDP ratio was around 75% in FY2008–2009 (Figure 18). The rise in public debt 
                                                  
18 The Indian government formulates a blue print of economic activities for five years in advance. This blueprint is 
popularly known as a five-year plan. So far 10 five-year plans have been completed and the XI plan is under 
implementation. 
19 It is argued by some observers that the policy response was delayed because the government was initially 
somewhat in a state of denial, believing that the global crisis would not affect the Indian economy as its 
banking sector was not at all affected. It was argued that the net contribution of trade to GDP growth is 
negative and hence the turmoil in the global market would not have any major impact on India. However, a 
sharp deterioration in some key sectors came as an eye opener for the government and it finally started 
responding to the crisis in December 2008.  
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to GDP ratio can be worrisome as it is now well above levels reached in 1991 when the 
country faced a major crisis. However, the present situation is not as serious primarily due to 
the strong external sector balance that India has been successful in building up since the 
beginning of this decade.  































































BE = budget estimates, RE = revised estimates. 
Source: Author’s calculations compiled from Reserve Bank of India 2009f 
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Source: Reserve Bank of India 2009a. 
In sharp contrast to the fiscal policy response,  the monetary authorities in India acted 
aggressively once it was clear that inflationary pressures had subsided and growth was 
beginning to slacken. Unfortunately, because of the government’s large borrowing 
requirement and the stickiness in deposit rates that keep the cost of funds high for the 
banks, the policy rate cuts have not filtered into the retail credit market. The commercial 
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bank’s lending rates, in real terms despite some reduction, are still very high and banks are 
not able to push up credit off-take. This is reflected in the continued decline in the growth of 
non-food credit off-take from commercial banks in recent months. The positive impact of 
monetary policy actions has therefore been somewhat limited. 
6.  POTENTIAL POLICY MEASURES TO REIGNITE 
GROWTH 
There is not much room for further fiscal policy action as the consolidated fiscal deficit of the 
central and state governments in FY2008–2009 is already approximately 11% of the GDP. 
The budget for FY2009–2010, presented on 6 July 2009, estimates the fiscal deficit in 
FY2009–2010 to be at the same level. This implies a significant increase in government 
borrowing, which has risen from Rs 126,912 crore (US$25.3 billion) in FY2007–2008 to Rs 
326,515 crore (US$65.3 billion) in FY2008–2009 and is likely to be Rs 400,996 crore 
(US$80.1 billion) in FY2009–2010. This also implies a further rise in the debt to GDP ratio, 
which is expected to go up to 77% and may induce credit rating agencies to review their 
rating of Indian sovereign debt. Debt servicing, which accounted for about 58% of total 
revenue receipts in FY2008–2009, is likely to rise even further and pose a significant risk. 
This large volume of government borrowing is bound to exert a significant upward pressure 
on market interest rates and also result in inflationary pressures, especially if agriculture 
output is adversely affected by deficient monsoons. Monetary policy will therefore face tough 
questions in the coming months. On the one hand it will be trying to hold interest rates down 
to stimulate private investment demand. On the other hand, it will have to keep a very careful 
eye on any inflationary tendencies and act quickly to restrain them. 
With very limited fiscal maneuverability and the monetary policy constrained by the trade off 
between holding down interest rates and preventing inflationary tendencies, the focus of 
policy measures must be to further raise India’s potential output growth rate. Various 
agencies have set the target growth rate between 8.5–9.0%, as shown in the chart below. 
Raising the potential growth rate requires another round of structural reforms that will 
improve the investment climate, especially for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that 
have suffered the most with the collapse of external demand and employ the majority of the 
work force. SMEs currently suffer from having to face a plethora of official procedures and 
licensing and regulatory requirements that raise their transactions costs significantly, making 
them uncompetitive in global markets and unable to withstand import competition in 
domestic markets. The government will do well to review all the policies that have an impact 
on “doing business” in India with the clear objective of improving the investment climate. The 
evidence for this will be best reflected in an improvement in India’s rankings in the World 
Bank surveys in the coming year. 
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Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
Other areas for policy attention that will help in removing some of the remaining structural 
bottlenecks on raising the potential GDP growth rate are the removal of entry barriers for 
corporate investment in education and vocational training, improving the delivery of public 
goods and services, and expanding physical infrastructure capacities, including a major 
effort at improving connectivity in the rural regions. These measures will constitute the 
second generation of structural reforms and will enable the Indian economy to climb out of 
the downward phase of the growth cycle and then to extend the upward phase for a longer 
period than was achieved in the last cycle. The two other areas that require attention and 
have been often discussed are an urgent improvement in the physical infrastructure and the 
delivery of public services, specifically urban utilities and law and order. Attention on these 
reforms will be far more effective and have a more permanent positive impact on raising 
India’s potential rate of growth, which is essential if India is to achieve its goals of poverty 
reduction and rapid and sustainable growth to improve the overall welfare level of its people.  
 
                                                  
20 HP filter technique has been used to calculate the potential GDP growth and output gap. 
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